Firearm Laws |
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Search & Seizure |
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Hiland v. Trent, 868 N.E. 2d 396, Third District
Appellate Court (5/16/07).
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People v. Williams, 858 N.E. 2nd 606. Illinois Appellate Court, Ist District.
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United States v. Cherry, 436 F. 3d 769 ( C.A. 7, Ill., 2006)
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People v. Miller, 824 N.E. 2d 1080 ,
Illinois 1st District Appellate Court (2-7-05).
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HUDSON v. MICHIGAN. United States Supreme Court, June 2006. 126 S. Ct. 2159
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People v. Dieppa, 357 Ill.
App. 3d 847
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ILLINOIS v. CABALLES. U.S.
Supreme Court (1/25/05)
on
writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Illinois. 03-923
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DEVENPECK et al. v. ALFORD No.
03-710
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People v. Parra, 352 Ill. App.
3d 584, 817 N.E. 2d 141 ( 2d Dist., 10/12/04)
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People v. Travis Smith, 346
Ill. App. 3d 146, 803 N.E. 2d 1074
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People v. Starbuck, 358 Ill
App. 3d 234 (3rd Dist. 2005)
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People v. Mendoza, 846 N.E. 2d 169 (2d Dist App. Ct.,
March 2006)
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People v. Frederick Hampton, 358 Ill App. 3d 1029 (2d Dist 2005)
and People v. Shinara Mathews, 357 Ill App. 3d 1062 (3rd Dist. 2005)
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People v. Mendoza, 846 N.E. 2d 169 (2d Dist App. Ct.,
March 2006)
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Facts: Two Aurora police officers in a
patrol car spotted the defendant driving a vehicle with a tinted rear window
and tinted rear license plate cover. Approaching defendant’s vehicle, the
officers also saw a red bandana hanging from his rear view mirror that appeared
to obstruct the driver’s vision, also arousing a suspicion that the defendant
was a member of a known street gang. The defendant was pulled over.
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Pursuant to the stop, the defendant produced his license and
proof of insurance and was told by one of the officers that no traffic citation
would be issued . However, the same officer then asked for permission to search
the vehicle, and the defendant declined. That officer then advised defendant
that he could leave, but before he drove away the second officer had circled
the vehicle and shined his flashlight from the passenger side and saw a gun
butt protruding from under the car seat. The defendant drove away before the
second officer could signal his partner. The officers then chased down the
vehicle, searched it and found a handgun.
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Trial & Appellate Court decisions:
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The trial court granted defendant’s motion to suppress,
finding that Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, as enunciated in
People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220, 789 N.E. 2d 260 (2003) were
controlling, and as applied by this appellate court ( 2d District) in People
v. Para, 352 Ill. App. 3d 584 ( See Para with commentary at Archives).
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The 2d District appellate court affirmed, noting that “although the trial
court’s ultimate conclusion was correct, the trial court’s analysis was not.”
The appellate tribunal found that the trial court had made two erroneous
factual findings that were contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence--but
that these factual mistakes were not material--and the officers had a
constitutional justification for stopping the defendant because of the tinted
rear license plate cover. However, notwithstanding that justification, and a
“heightened need for safety” that the officers felt based on their viewing of
the supposed red bandana as a gang symbol, “they had no legal justification for
searching defendant’s car for a gun or anything else.”
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The appellate court noted that the trial court found the
second tier of Terry principles not satisfied because the officer’s
questioning was not related to the reason for the initial stop, and concluded
that the continued questioning both impermissibly prolonged the traffic stop
and changed its fundamental nature (Gonzalez), thus finding a Fourth
Amendment violation had occurred.
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Applying its analysis, the appellate tribunal put aside both Gonzalez
and Terry and held that the officer’s continued questioning of the
defendant, after he returned his license and insurance information,
constituted a second seizure, the “traffic stop seizure” having ended when the
officer returned the defendant’s credentials and stated that no citation would
issue. The Court, therefore, concluded: “. . .[B]ecause a reasonable person in
Mendoza’s [defendant’s] position would not have felt free to leave when
investigator Weber continued questioning him after the conclusion of the
traffic stop, Mendoza was seized. That seizure was not supported by reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity. And that seizure led directly to the discovery
of the evidence against Mendoza. Thus, the trial court did not err in granting
Mendoza’s motion to suppress. . . . Affirmed “
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